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In this paper, I review the literature on the formulation and estimation of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models with a special emphasis on Bayesian methods. First, I discuss the evolution
of DSGE models over the last couple of decades. Second, I explain why the profession has decided
to estimate these models using Bayesian methods. Third, I briefly introduce some of the techniques
required to compute and estimate these models. Fourth, I illustrate the techniques under consideration
by estimating a benchmark DSGE model with real and nominal rigidities. I conclude by offering some








This article elaborates on a basic thesis: the formal estimation of dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models has become one of the cornerstones of modern macroeconomics.
The combination of rich structural models, novel solution algorithms, and powerful simulation
techniques has allowed researchers to transform the quantitative implementation of equilib-
rium models from a disparate collection of ad hoc procedures to a systematic discipline where
progress is fast and prospects entrancing. This captivating area of research, which for lack of
a better name I call the New Macroeconometrics, is changing the way we think about models
and about economic policy advice.
In the next pages, I will lay out my case in detail. I will start by framing the appearance
of DSGE models in the context of the evolution of contemporary macroeconomics and how
economists have reacted to incorporate both theoretical insights and empirical challenges.
Then, I will explain why the New Macroeconometrics mainly follows a Bayesian approach. I
will introduce some of the new techniques in the literature. I will illustrate these points with
a benchmark application and I will conclude with a discussion of where I see the research at
the frontier of macroeconometrics. Because of space limitations, I will not survey the ￿eld
in exhausting detail or provide a complete description of the tools involved (indeed, I will
o⁄er the biased recommendation of many of my own papers). Instead, I will o⁄er an entry
point to the topic that, like the proverbial Wittgenstein￿ s ladder, can eventually be discarded
without undue apprehension once the reader has mastered the ideas considered here. The in-
terested economist can also ￿nd alternative material on An and Schorfheide (2006), who focus
more than I do on Bayesian techniques and less in pure macroeconomics, and in FernÆndez-
Villaverde, Guerr￿n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ram￿rez (2008), where the work is related with
general issues in Bayesian statistics, and in the recent textbooks on macroeconometrics by
Canova (2007) and DeJong and Dave (2007).
2. The Main Thesis
Dynamic equilibrium theory made a quantum leap between the early 1970s and the late 1990s.
In the comparatively brief space of 30 years, macroeconomists went from writing prototype
models of rational expectations (think of Lucas, 1972) to handling complex constructions like
the economy in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005). It was similar to jumping from
the Wright brothers to an Airbus 380 in one generation.
2A particular keystone for that development was, of course, Kydland and Prescott￿ s 1982
paper Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations. For the ￿rst time, macroeconomists had a
small and coherent dynamic model of the economy, built from ￿rst principles with optimizing
agents, rational expectations, and market clearing, that could generate data that resembled
observed variables to a remarkable degree. Yes, there were many dimensions along which the
model failed, from the volatility of hours to the persistence of output. But the amazing feature
was how well the model did despite having so little of what was traditionally thought of as
the necessary ingredients of business cycle theories: money, nominal rigidities, or non-market
clearing.
Except for a small but dedicated group of followers at Minnesota, Rochester, and other
bastions of heresy, the initial reaction to Kydland and Prescott￿ s assertions varied from
amused incredulity to straightforward dismissal. The critics were either appalled by the whole
idea that technological shocks could account for a substantial fraction of output volatility or
infuriated by what they considered the super￿ uity of technical ￿reworks. After all, could
we not have done the same in a model with two periods? What was so important about
computing the whole equilibrium path of the economy?
It turns out that while the ￿rst objection regarding the plausibility of technological shocks
is alive and haunting us (even today the most sophisticated DSGE models still require a no-
table role for technological shocks, which can be seen as a good or a bad thing depending
on your perspective), the second complaint has aged rapidly. As Max Plank remarked some-
where, a new methodology does not triumph by convincing its opponents, but rather because
critics die and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it.1 Few occasions demonstrate
the insight of Plank￿ s witticism better than the spread of DSGE models. The new cohorts
of graduate students quickly became acquainted with the new tools employed by Kydland
and Prescott, such as recursive methods and computation, if only because of the comparative
advantage that the mastery of technical material o⁄ers to young, ambitious minds.2 And
naturally, in the process, younger researchers began to appreciate the ￿ exibility o⁄ered by
the tools. Once you know how to write down a value function in a model with complete
markets and fully ￿ exible prices, introducing rigidities or other market imperfections is only
one step ahead: one more state variable here or there and you have a job market paper.
1Admittedly, Plank talked about scienti￿c truths and not methodologies, but the original incarnation
sounds too outmodedly positivist for the contemporary foucaultian spirit.
2Galeson￿ s (2007) insights about the two types of artistic creativity and their life cycles are bound to apply
to researchers as well.
3Obviously, I did not mention rigidities as a random example of contraptions that we
include in our models, but to direct our attention to how surprisingly popular such additions
to the main model turned out to be. Most macroeconomists, myself included, have always
had a soft spot for nominal or real rigidities. A cynic will claim it is just because they are
most convenient. After all, they dispense with the necessity for re￿ ection, since there is hardly
any observation of the aggregate behavior of the economy cannot be blamed on one rigidity
or another.3
But just because a theory is inordinately serviceable or warrants the more serious accu-
sation that it encourages mental laziness is certainly not proof that the theory is not true.
At least since David Hume, economists have believed that they have identi￿ed a monetary
transmission mechanism from increases in money to short-run ￿ uctuations caused by some
form or another of price stickiness. It takes much courage, and more aplomb, to dismiss two
and a half centuries of a tradition linking Hume to Woodford and going through Marshall,
Keynes, and Friedman. Even those with less of a Burkean mind than mine should feel re-
luctant to proceed in such a perilous manner. Moreover, after one ￿nishes reading Friedman
and Schwartz￿ s (1971) A Monetary History of the U.S. or slogging through the mountain of
Vector Autoregressions (VARs) estimated over 25 years, it must be admitted that those who
see money as an important factor in business cycles ￿ uctuations have an impressive empirical
case to rely on. Here is not the place to evaluate all these claims (although in the interest
of disclosure, I must admit that I am myself less than totally convinced of the importance of
money outside the case of large in￿ ations). Su¢ ce it to say that the previous arguments of
intellectual tradition and data were a motivation compelling enough for the large number of
economists who jumped into the possibility of combining the beauty of DSGE models with
the importance of money documented by empirical studies.
Researchers quickly found that we basically require three elements for that purpose. First,
we need monopolistic competition. Without market power, any ￿rm that does not immedi-
ately adjust its prices will lose all its sales. While monopolistic competition can be incorpo-
rated in di⁄erent ways, the favorite route is to embody the Dixit-Stiglitz framework into a
general equilibrium environment, as so beautifully done by Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
While not totally satisfactory (for example, the basic Dixit-Stiglitz setup implies counterfac-
tually constant mark-ups), the framework has proven to be easy to handle and surprisingly
3A more sophisticated critic will even point out that the presence of rigidities at the micro level may wash
out at an aggregate level, as in the wonderful example of Caplin and Spulber (1987).
4￿ exible. Second, we need some role to justify the existence of money. Money in the util-
ity function or a cash-in-advance constraint can accomplish that goal in a not particularly
elegant but rather e⁄ective way.4 Third, we need a monetary authority inducing nominal
shocks to the economy. A monetary policy rule, such as a money growth process or a Taylor
rule, usually nicely stands in for such authority. There were, in addition, two extra elements
that improve the ￿t of the model. First, to delay and extend the response of the economy
to shocks, macroeconomists postulated factors such as habit persistence in consumption, ad-
justment cost of investment, or a changing utilization rate of capital. Finally, many extra
shocks were added: to investment, to preferences, to monetary and ￿scal policy, etc.5
The stochastic neoclassical growth model of Kydland and Prescott showed a remarkable
ability to absorb all these mechanisms. After a transitional period of amalgamation during the
1990s, by 2003, the model augmented with nominal and real rigidities was su¢ ciently mature
as to be put in a textbook by Mike Woodford and to become the basis for applied work. For
the ￿rst time, DSGE models were su¢ ciently ￿ exible to ￿t the data su¢ ciently well as to
be competitive with VARs in terms of forecasting power (see Edge, Kiley, and Laforte, 2008,
for the enchantingly good forecast record of a state-of-the-art DSGE model) and rich enough
to become laboratories where realistic economic policies could be evaluated. The rest of the
history is simple: DSGE models quickly became the standard tool for quantitative analysis of
policies and every self-respecting central bank felt that it needed to estimate its own DSGE
model.6 However, as surprising as the quick acceptance of DSGE models outside academic
circles was, even more unexpected was the fact that models were not only formally estimated,
leaving behind the rather unsatisfactory calibration approach, but they were estimated from
a Bayesian perspective.
4Wallace (2001) has listed many reasons to suspect that these mechanisms may miss important channels
through which money matters. After all, they are reduced forms of an underlying model and, as such, they
may not be invariant to policy changes. Unfortunately, the profession has not developed a well-founded
model of money that can be taken to the data and applied to policy analysis. Despite some recent promising
progress (Lagos and Wright, 2005), money in the utility function or cash-in-advance will be with us for many
years to come.
5Also, researchers learned that it was easy to incorporate home production (Benhabib et al., 1991), an
open-economy sector (Mendoza, 1991 and 1995, Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland, 1992 and 1995, and Correia,
Neves, and Rebelo, 1995) or a ￿nancial sector (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999) among other extensions
that I cannot discuss here.
6Examples include the Federal Reserve Board (Erceg, Guerrieri, and Gust, 2006), the European Central
Bank (Christo⁄el, Coenen, and Warne, 2007), the Bank of Canada (Murchison and Rennison, 2006), the
Bank of England (Harrison et al., 2005), the Bank of Sweden (Adolfson et al., 2005), the Bank of Finland
(Kilponen and Ripatti, 2006 and Kortelainen, 2002), and the Bank of Spain (AndrØs, Burriel, and Estrada,
2006).
53. The Bayesian Approach
I took my ￿rst course in Bayesian econometrics from John Geweke at the University of
Minnesota in the fall of 1996. I remember how, during one of the lectures in that course,
Geweke forecasted that in a few years, we would see a considerable proportion of papers in
applied macro being written from a Bayesian perspective. I was rather skeptical about the
prediction and dismissed Geweke￿ s claim as an overly optimistic assessment by a committed
Bayesian. Fortunately, Geweke was right and I was wrong. The last decade has indeed
experienced an explosion of research using Bayesian methods; so much so that, during a
recent talk, when I was presenting an estimation that for several reasons I had done using
maximum likelihood, I was assailed by repeated instances of the question: why didn￿ t you
use Bayes?, a predicament rather unimaginable even a decade ago.
How did such a remarkable change come about? It would be tempting to re-enumerate, as
has been done innumerable times before, the long list of theoretical advantages of Bayesian
statistics and state that it was only a matter of time before economists would accept the
obvious superiority of the Bayes choice. In fact, I will momentarily punish the reader with
yet one more review of some of those advantages, just to be sure that we are all on board.
But the simpler truth is that, suddenly, doing Bayesian econometrics was easier than doing
maximum likelihood.7
The reason is that maximizing a complicated, highly dimensional function like the likeli-
hood of a DSGE model is actually much harder than it is to integrate it, which is what we
do in a Bayesian exercise. First, the likelihood of DSGE models is, as I have just mentioned,
a highly dimensional object, with a dozen or so parameters in the simplest cases to close to
a hundred in some of the richest models in the literature. Any search in a high dimensional
function is fraught with peril. More pointedly, likelihoods of DSGE models are full of local
maxima and minima and of nearly ￿ at surfaces. This is due both to the sparsity of the data
(quarterly data do not give us the luxury of many observations that micro panels provide)
and to the ￿ exibility of DSGE models in generating similar behavior with relatively di⁄erent
combination of parameter values (every time you see a sensitivity analysis claiming that the
results of the paper are robust to changes in parameter values, think about ￿ at likelihoods).
7This revival of Bayesian tools is by no means limited to econometrics. Bayesian methods have become
extremely popular in many ￿elds, such as genetics, cognitive science, weather analysis, and computer science.
The forthcoming Handbook of Applied Bayesian Analysis edited by O￿ Hagan and West is a good survey of
Bayesian statistics across many di⁄erent disciplines.
6Consequently, even sophisticated maximization algorithms like simulated annealing or the
simplex method run into serious di¢ culties when maximizing the likelihoods of dynamic
models. Moreover, the standard errors of the estimates are notoriously di¢ cult to compute
and their asymptotic distribution a poor approximation to the small sample one.
In comparison, Markov chain Monte Carlo (McMc) methods have a much easier time
exploring the likelihood (more precisely, the likelihood times the prior) of DSGE models and
o⁄er a thorough view of our object of interest. That is why we may want to use McMc
methods even when dealing with classical problems. Chernozhukov and Hong (2003) is a
path-breaking paper that brought that possibility to the attention of the profession. Even
more relevantly, McMc can be transported from application to application with a relatively
small degree of ￿ne tuning, an attractive property since the comparative advantage of most
economists is not in numerical analysis (and, one suspects, neither their absolute advantage).
I promised before, though, that before entering into a more detailed description of tech-
niques like McMc, I would in￿ ict upon the reader yet another enumeration of the advantages
of Bayesian thinking. But fortunately, this will be, given the circumstances of this paper, a
rather short introduction. A whole textbook treatment of Bayesian statistics can be found
in several excellent books in the market, among which I will recommend Robert (2001) and
Bernardo and Smith (2000).
I start with a point that Chris Sims repeatedly makes in his talks: Bayesian inference is a
way of thinking, not a ￿basket￿of methods. Classical statistics searches for procedures that
work well ex ante, i.e., procedures that applied in a repeated number of samples will deliver
the right answer in a prespeci￿ed percentage of cases. This prescription is not, however, a
constructive recipe. It tells us a property of the procedure we want to build and not how to
do it. Consequently, we can come up with a large list of procedures that achieve the same
objective without a clear metric to pick among them. The best possible illustration is the large
number of tests that can be de￿ned to evaluate the null hypothesis of cointegration of two
random variables, each with its strengths and weaknesses. Furthermore, the procedures may
be quite di⁄erent in their philosophy and interpretation. In comparison, Bayesian inference
is summarized in one simple idea: the Bayes￿theorem. Instead of spending our time proving
yet one more asymptotic distribution of a novel estimator, we can go directly to the data,
apply Bayes￿theorem, and learn from it. As simple as that.
Let me outline the elements that appear in the theorem. First, we have some data
yT ￿ fytg
T
t=1 2 RN￿T . For simplicity, I will use an index t that is more natural in a time
7series context like the one I will use below, but minimum work would adapt the notation to
cross-sections or panels. From the Bayesian perspective, data are always given and, in most
contexts, it does not make much sense to think about it as the realization of some data-
generating process (except, perhaps when exploring some asymptotic properties of Bayesian
methods as in Phillips and Ploberger, 1996, and FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez,
2004). Second, we have a model, motivated either by economic theory or some other type of
reasoning. The model is indexed by i and it may be an instance of a set of possible models
to consider M; i.e., we have i 2 M: The model is composed by:
1. A parameter set, ￿i 2 Rki, that de￿nes the admissible value of the parameters that
index the functions in the model. Some restrictions come from statistics. For instance,
variances must be positive. Others come from economic reasoning. For example, it
is common to bound the discount factor in an intertemporal choice problem to ensure
that total utility is well de￿ned.
2. A likelihood function p(yTj￿;i) : RN￿T ￿ ￿i ! R+ that tells us the probability that
the model assigns to each observation given some parameter values. This likelihood
function is nothing more than the restrictions that our model imposes on the data,
either coming from statistical considerations or from equilibrium conditions.
3. A prior distribution ￿ (￿ji) : ￿i ! R+ that captures pre-sample beliefs about the right
value of the parameters (yes, ￿right￿is an awfully ambiguous word; I will come back
later to what I mean by it).









This result, which follows from a basic application of the laws of probability, tells us how
we should update our beliefs about parameter values: we combine our prior beliefs, ￿ (￿ji);





: In fact, Bayes￿theorem is an optimal information processing rule as
de￿ned by Zellner (1988): it uses e¢ ciently all of the available information in the data, both
in small and large samples, without adding any extraneous information.
Armed with Bayes￿theorem, a researcher does not need many more tools. For any possible
model, one just writes down the likelihood, elicits the prior, and obtains the posterior. Once
8we have the posterior distribution of the parameters, we can perform inference like point esti-
mation or model comparison given a loss function that maps how much we select an incorrect
parameter value or model. For sure, these tasks can be onerous in terms of implementation
but, conceptually, they are straightforward. Consequently, issues such as nonstationarity do
not require speci￿c methods as needed in classical inference (see the eye-opening helicopter
tour of Sims and Uhlig, 1991). If we suspect non-stationarities, we may want to change our
priors to re￿ ect that belief, but the likelihood function will still be the same and Bayes￿theo-
rem is applicable without the disconcerting discontinuities of classical procedures around the
unit root.
But while coherence is certainly an attractive property, at least from an esthetic considera-
tion, it is not enough by itself. A much more relevant point is that coherence is a consequence
of the fact that Bayes￿theorem can be derived from a set of axioms that decision theorists
have proposed to characterize rational behavior. It is not an accident that the main solution
concepts in games with incomplete information are Bayesian Nash equilibria and sequential
equilibria and that Bayes￿theorem plays a critical role in the construction of these solution
concepts. It is ironic that we constantly see papers where the researcher speci￿es that the
rational agents in the model follow Bayes￿theorem and, then, she proceeds to estimate the
model using classical procedures, undaunted by the implied logical contradiction.
Closely related to this point is the fact that the Bayesian approach satis￿es by construction
the Likelihood Principle (Berger and Wolpert, 1988) that states that all of the information
existing in a sample is contained in the likelihood function. Once one learns about how
Birnbaum (1962) derived the Likelihood Principle from more fundamental axioms, it is rather
di¢ cult not to accept it.
The advantages of Bayesian inference do not end here. First, Bayesian econometrics
o⁄ers a set of answers that are relevant for users. In comparison, pre-sample probability
statements are, on most occasions, rather uninteresting from a practical perspective. Few
policy makers will be very excited if we inform them that in 95 of 100 possible samples, our
model measures that a certain policy increases welfare but that we cannot really know if
the actual data represents one of the 95 positive cases or one of the negative 5. They want
to know, conditional on what we have observed in the data, what is the probability that we
would be doing the right thing by, for instance, lowering the interest rate. A compelling proof
of how unnatural it is to think in frequentist terms is to teach introductory statistics. Nearly
all students will interpret con￿dence intervals at ￿rst as a probability interval. Only the
9repeated insistence of the instructor will make a disappointingly small minority of students
understand the di⁄erence between the two and provide the right interpretation. The rest of
the students, of course, would simply memorize the answer for the test in the same way they
would memorize a sentence in Aramaic if such a worthless accomplishment were useful to
get a passing grade. Neither policy makers nor undergraduate students are silly (they are
ignorant, but that is a very di⁄erent sin); they just think in ways that are more natural to
humans.8 Frequentist statements are beautiful but inconsequential.
Second, pre-sample information is often amazingly rich and considerably useful and not
taking advantage of it is an unforgivable omission. For instance, microeconometric evidence
can guide our building of priors. If we have a substantial set of studies that estimate the
discount factor of individuals and they ￿nd a range of values between 0.9 and 0.99, any
sensible prior should take this information into consideration.
The researcher should be careful, though, translating this micro evidence into macro
priors. Parameter values do not have an existence of their own, like a Platonic entity waiting
to be discovered. They are only de￿ned within the context of a model, and changes in
the theory, even if minor, may have a considerable impact on the parameter values. A
paradigmatic example is labor supply. For a long time, labor economists criticized the real
business cycle models because they relied on what they saw as an unreasonably high labor
supply elasticity (Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2006, is a recent instance of such criticism).
However, the evidence that fed their attacks was gathered mainly for prime age white males
in the United States (or a similarly restrictive group). But representative agent models are
not about prime age white males: the representative agent is instead a stand-in for everyone
in the economy. It has a bit of a prime age male and a bit of old woman, a bit of a minority
young and a bit of a part-timer. If much of the response of labor to changes in wages is
done through the labor supply of women and young workers, it is perfectly possible to have a
high aggregate elasticity of labor supply and a low labor supply elasticity of prime age males.
To illustrate this point, Rogerson and Wallenius (2007) construct an overlapping generations
economy where the micro and macro elasticities are virtually unrelated. But we should not
push the previous example to an exaggerated degree: it is a word of caution, not a licence to
concoct wild priors. If the researcher wants to depart in her prior from the micro estimates,
she must have at least some plausible explanation of why she is doing so (see Browning,
8See also the psychological evidence that humans￿cognitive processes are well described by Bayes￿theorem
presented by Gri¢ ths and Tenenbaum (2006).
10Hansen, and Heckman (1999) for a thorough discussion of the mapping between micro and
macro estimates).
An alternative source of pre-sample information is the estimates of macro parameters from
di⁄erent countries. One of the main di⁄erences between economists and other social scientists
is that we have a default belief that individuals are basically the same across countries and
that di⁄erences in behavior can be accounted for by di⁄erences in relative prices. Therefore,
if we have estimates from Germany that the discount factor in a DSGE model is around 0.98,
it is perfectly reasonable to believe that the discount factor in Spain, if we estimate the same
model, should be around 0.98. Admittedly, di⁄erences in demographics or ￿nancial markets
may show up as slightly di⁄erent discount factors, but again, the German experience is most
informative. Pre-sample information is particularly convenient when we deal with emerging
economies, when the data as extremely limited, or when we face a change in policy regime.
A favorite example of mine concerns the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB). If
we were back in 1998 or 1999 trying to estimate a model of how the ECB works, we would
face such a severe limitation in the length of the data that any classical method would fail
miserably. However, we could have used a Bayesian method where the prior would have been
that the ECB would behave in a way very similar than the German Bundesbank. Yes, our
inference would have depended heavily on the prior, but why is this situation any worse than
not being able to say anything of consequence? Real life is full of situations where data are
extremely sparse (or where they speak to us very softly about the di⁄erence between two
models, like a unit root process and an AR(1) with coe¢ cient 0.99) and we need to make the
best of a bad situation by carefully eliciting priors.9
Third, Bayesian econometrics allows a direct computation of many objects of interest,
such as the posterior distribution of welfare gains, values at risk, fan charts, and many
other complicated functions of the underlaying parameters while capturing in these computed
objects all the existing uncertainty regarding parameter values. For example, instead of
computing the multiplier of an increase in public consumption (per se, not a very useful
number for a politician), we can ￿nd the whole posterior distribution of employment changes
in the next year conditioning on what we know about the evolution of the economy plus
9We can push the arguments to the limit. Strictly speaking we can perform Bayesian inference without
any data: our posterior is just equal to the prior! We often face this situation. Imagine that we were back in
1917 and we just heard about the Russian revolution. Since communism had never been tried, as economists
we would need to endorse or reject the new economic system exclusively based on our priors about how well
central planning could work. Waiting 70 years to see how well the whole experiment would work is not a
reasonable course of action.
11the e⁄ect of an increase in public consumption. Such an object, with its whole assessment of
risks, is a much more relevant tool for policy analysis. Classical procedures have a much more
di¢ cult time jumping from point estimates to whole distributions of policy-relevant objects.
Finally, Bayesian econometrics deals in a natural way with misspeci￿ed models (Monfort,
1996). As the old saying goes, all models are false, but some are useful. Bayesians are not
in the business of searching for the truth but only in coming up with good description of
the data. Hence, estimation moves away from being a process of discovery of some ￿true￿
value of a parameter to being, in Rissanen￿ s (1986) powerful words, a selection device in
the parameter space that maximizes our ability to use the model as a language in which
to express the regular features of the data. Coming back to our previous discussion about
￿right￿parameters, Rissanen is telling us to pick those parameter values that allow us to tell
powerful economic histories and to exert control over outcomes of interest. These parameter
values, which I will call ￿pseudotrue,￿ may be, for example, the ones that minimize the
Kullback-Leibler distance between the data generating process and the model (FernÆndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez, 2004, o⁄er a detailed explanation of why we care about these
￿pseudotrue￿parameter values).
Also, by thinking about models and parameters in this way, we come to the discussion of
partially identi￿ed models initiated by Manski (1999) from a di⁄erent perspective. Bayesians
emphasize more the ￿normality￿of a lack of identi￿cation than the problems caused by it.
Bayesians can still perform all of their work without further complications or the need of
new theorems even with a ￿ at posterior (and we can always achieve identi￿cation through
non-￿ at priors, although such an accomplishment is slightly boring). For example, I can still
perfectly evaluate the welfare consequences of one action if the posterior of my parameter
values is ￿ at in some or all of the parameter space. The answer I get may have a large degree
of uncertainty, but there is nothing conceptually di⁄erent about the inference process. This
does not imply, of course, that identi￿cation is not a concern.10 I only mean that identi￿cation
is a somehow di⁄erent preoccupation for a Bayesian.
I would not be fully honest, however, if I did not discuss, if only brie￿ y, the disadvantages
of Bayesian inference. The main one, in my opinion, is that many non-parametric and
semiparametric approaches sound more natural when set up in a classical framework. Think
about the case of the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). The ￿rst time you hear about
10Identi￿cation issues ought to be discussed in more detail in DSGE models, since they a⁄ect the conclusions
we get from them. See Canova and Sala (2006) for examples of non-identi￿ed DSGE models and further
discussion.
12it in class, your brain (or at least mine!) goes ￿ah!, this makes perfect sense.￿And it does
so because GMM (and all its related cousins in the literature of empirical likelihood, Owen,
2001, and, in economics, Kitamura and Stutzer, 1997) are clear and intuitive procedures that
have a transparent and direct link with ￿rst order conditions and equilibrium equations. Also,
methods of moments are a good way to estimate models with multiple equilibria, since all of
those equilibria need to satisfy certain ￿rst order conditions that we can exploit to come up
with a set of moments.11 Even if you can cook up many things in a Bayesian framework that
look a lot like GMM or empirical likelihood (see, for example, Kim, 1998, Schennach, 2005,
or Ragusa, 2006, among several others), I have never been particularly satis￿ed with any of
them and none has passed the ￿ah!￿test that GMM overcomes with such an excellent grade.
Similarly, you can implement a non-parametric Bayesian analysis (see the textbook by
Ghosh and Ramamoorthi, 2003, and in economics, Chamberlain and Imbens, 2003). However,
the methods are not as well developed as we would like and the shining building of Bayesian
statistics gets dirty with some awful discoveries such as the potentially bad asymptotic prop-
erties of Bayesian estimators (￿rst pointed out by Freedman, 1963) or the breakdown of the
likelihood principle (Robins and Ritov, 1997). Given that the literature is rapidly evolving,
Bayesian methods may end up catching up and even overcoming classical procedures for non-
parametric and semiparametric problems, but this has not happened yet. In the meantime,
the advantage in this sub-area seems to be in the frequentist camp.
4. The Tools
No matter how sound were the DSGE models presented by the literature or how compelling
the arguments for Bayesian inference, the whole research program would not have taken o⁄
without the appearance of the right set of tools that made the practical implementation of the
estimation of DSGE models feasible in a standard desktop computer. Otherwise, we would
probably still be calibrating our models, which would be, in addition, much smaller and
simpler. I will classify those tools in three sets. First, better and improved solution methods.
Second, methods to evaluate the likelihood of the model. Third, methods to explore the
likelihood of the model.
11A simple way to generate multiplicity of equilibria in a DSGE model that can be very relevant empirically
is to have increasing returns to scale, as in Benhabib and Farmer (1992). For a macro perspective on estimation
of models with multiplicity of equilibria, see Jovanovic (1989) or Cooper (2002).
134.1. Solution Methods
DSGE models do not have, except for a very few exceptions, a ￿paper and pencil￿solution.
Hence, we are forced to resort to numerical approximations to characterize the equilibrium
dynamics of the model. Numerical analysis is not part of the standard curriculum either at the
undergraduate or the graduate level. Consequently, the profession had a tough time accepting
that analytic results are limited (despite the fact that the limitations of close form ￿ndings
happens in most other sciences where the transition to numerical approximations happened
more thoroughly and with less soul searching). To make things worse, few economists were
con￿dent in dealing with the solution of stochastic di⁄erence functional equations, which
are the core of the solution of a DSGE model. The ￿rst approaches were based on ￿tting
the models to be solved into the framework of what was described in standard optimal
control literature textbooks. For example, Kydland and Prescott (1982) substituted the
original problem by a linear quadratic approximation to it. King, Plosser, and Rebelo (in the
widely disseminated technical appendix, not published until 2002) linearized the equilibrium
conditions, and Christiano (1990) applied value function iteration. Even if those approaches
are still the cornerstone of much of what is done nowadays, as time passed, researchers became
familiar with them, many improvements were proposed, and software circulated.
Let me use the example of linearization, since it is the solution method that I will use
below.12 Judd and Guu (1993) showed that linearization was not an ad hoc procedure but
the ￿rst order term of a mainstream tool in scienti￿c computation, perturbation. The idea
of perturbation methods is to substitute the original problem, which is di¢ cult to solve, for
a simpler one that we know how to handle and use the solution of the simpler model to ap-
proximate the solution of the problem we are interested in. In the case of DSGE models, we
￿nd an approximated solution by ￿nding a Taylor expansion of the policy function describing
the dynamics of the variables of the model around the deterministic steady state. Lineariza-
tion, therefore, is just the ￿rst term of this Taylor expansion. But once we understand this,
it is straightforward to get higher order expansions that are both analytically informative
and more accurate (as in Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2004).13 Similarly, we can apply all of
12Other solution methods for DSGE models, such as projection algorithms and value function iteration,
are described and compared in Aruoba, FernÆndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ram￿rez (2006). Judd (1998) is a
comprehensive textbook.
13For example, a second order expansion includes a term that corrects for the standard deviation of the
shocks that drive the dynamics of the economy. This term, which captures precautionary behavior, breaks
the certainty equivalence of linear approximations that makes it di¢ cult to talk about welfare and risk.
14the accumulated knowledge of perturbation methods in terms of theorems or in improving
the performance of the method.14 Second, once economists became more experienced with
linearization, software disseminated very quickly.
My favorite example is Dynare and Dynare++, an extraordinary tool developed by Michel
Juillard and a teamof collaborators. Dynare (a toolbox for Matlab and Scilab) and Dynare++
(a stand-alone application) allow the researcher to write, in a concise and intuitive language,
the equilibrium conditions of a DSGE model and ￿nd a perturbation solution to it, up to
second order in Dynare and to an arbitrary order in Dynare++. With Dynare and Dynare++,
a moderately experienced user can write code for a basic real business cycle model in an hour
and compute the approximated solution in a few seconds. The computation of the model
presented below (a fairly sophisticated one) requires a bit more e⁄ort, but still coding can
be done in a short period of time (as short as a day or two for an experienced user) and the
solution and simulation take only a few seconds. This advance in the ease of computation is
nothing short of breathtaking.
4.2. Evaluating the Likelihood Function
In our previous description of Bayes￿theorem, the likelihood function of the model played a
key role, since it was the object that we multiplied by our prior to obtain a posterior. The
challenge is how to obtain the likelihood of a DSGE model for which we do not even have an
analytic solution. The most general and powerful route is to employ the tools of state space
representations and ￿ltering theory.
Once we have the solution of the DSGE model in terms of its (approximated) policy
functions, we can write the laws of motion of the variables in a state space representation
that consists of:
1. A transition equation, St = f (St￿1;Wt;￿); where St is the vector of states that describe
14Here I can cite the idea of changing variables (FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez, 2006). Instead
of writing a Taylor expansion in terms of a variable x:
f (x) ’ f (a) + f0 (a)(x ￿ a) + H:O:T:
we can write it in terms of a transformed variable Y (x):
g (y) = h(f (X (y))) = g (b) + g0 (b)(Y (x) ￿ b) + H:O:T:
where b = Y (a) and X (y) is the inverse of Y (x). By picking the right change of variables, we can signi￿cantly
increase the accuracy of the perturbation. A common example of change of variables (although rarely thought
of in this way) is to loglinearize instead of linearizing in levels.
15the situation of the model in any given moment in time, Wt is a vector of innovations,
and ￿ is a vector with the structural parameters that describe technology, preferences,
and information processes.
2. A measurement equation, Yt = g (St;Vt;￿); where Yt are the observables and Vt a set
of shocks to the observables (like, but necessarily, measurement errors).
While the transition equation is unique up to an equivalent class, the measurement equa-
tion depends on what we assume we can observe, selection that may imply many degrees of
freedom (and not trivial consequences for inference; see the experiments in Guerr￿n-Quintana,
2008).15
The state space representation lends itself to many convenient computations. To begin
with, from St = f (St￿1;Wt;￿); we can compute p(StjSt￿1;￿), from Yt = g (St;Vt;￿), we can
compute p(YtjSt;￿); and from St = f (St￿1;Wt;￿) and Yt = g (St;Vt;￿), we have:
Yt = g (f (St￿1;Wt;￿);Vt;￿)
and hence we can compute p(YtjSt￿1;￿) (here I am omitting the technical details regarding
the existence of these objects).
All of these conditional densities appear in the likelihood function in a slightly disguised
































Hence, knowledge of fp(Stjyt￿1;￿)g
T
t=1 and p(S1;￿) allow the evaluation of the likelihood of
the model.
Filtering theory is the branch of mathematics that is preoccupied precisely with ￿nding
the sequence of conditional distributions of states given observations, fp(Stjyt￿1;￿)g
T
t=1 : For
15Also, I am assuming that there exists a state space representation that is Markov in some vector of states.
By admitting no-payo⁄ relevant states, like Lagrangian multipliers that encode continuation utilities (Abreu,
Pearce, and Stachetti, 1990), we can ￿t a large class of economic models into this setup.





































is the conditional likelihood.
The Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, despite its intimidating name, tells us only that the
distribution of states tomorrow given an observation until today, p(St+1jyt;￿), is equal to the
distribution today of p(Stjyt;￿) times the transition probabilities p(St+1jSt;￿) integrated over
all possible states. Therefore, the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation just gives us a forecasting
rule for the evolution of states. Bayes￿theorem updates the distribution of states p(Stjyt￿1;￿)
when a new observation arrives given its probability p(ytjSt;￿): By a recursive application




While the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation and Bayes￿theorem are mathematically rather
straightforward objects, their practical implementation is cumbersome because they involve
the computation of numerous integrals. Even when the number of states is moderate, the
computational cost of these integrals makes an exact (or up to ￿ oating point accuracy)
evaluation of the integrals unfeasible.
4.2.1. The Kalman Filter
To ￿x this computational problem, we have two routes. First, if the transition and measure-
ment equation are linear and the shocks are normally distributed, we can take advantage of
the observation that all of the relevant conditional distributions are Gaussian (this just from
the simple fact that the space of normal distributions is a vector space). Therefore, we only
need to keep track of the mean and variance of these conditional normals. The tracking of
the moments is done through the Ricatti equations of the Kalman ￿lter (for more details, see
any standard textbook, such as Harvey, 1989, or Stengel, 1994).
17To do so, we start by writing the ￿rst order linear approximation to the solution of the
model in the state space representation we introduced above:
st = Ast￿1 + B"t (1)
yt = Cst + D"t (2)
"t ￿ N(0;I)
where we use lower case letters to denote realizations of the random variable and where "t is
the vector of innovations to the model that stacks Wt and Vt.
Let us de￿ne the linear projections stjt￿1 = E(stjYt￿1) and stjt = E(stjYt) where Yt =
fy1;y2;:::;ytg and the subindex tracks the conditioning set (i.e., tjt￿1 means a draw at mo-












Given these linear projections and the Gaussian structure of our state space representations,
the one-step-ahead forecast error, ￿t = yt ￿ Cstjt￿1; is white noise.
We forecast the evolution of states:
stjt￿1 = Ast￿1jt￿1 (3)
Since the possible presence of correlation in the innovations does not change the nature of
the ￿lter (Stengel, 1994), so it is still the case that
stjt = stjt￿1 + K￿t; (4)
where K is the Kalman gain at time t. De￿ne variance of forecast as Vy = CPtjt￿1C0 + DD0:













The last step is to update our estimates of the states. De￿ne residuals ￿tjt￿1 = st ￿ stjt￿1
and ￿tjt = st ￿ stjt. Subtracting equation (3) from equation (1)





￿tjt￿1 = A￿t￿1jt￿1 + Bwt (5)
18Now subtract equation (4) from equation (1)
st ￿ stjt = st ￿ stjt￿1 ￿ K
￿
Cst + Dwt ￿ Cstjt￿1
￿
































































Consequently, the updating equations are:






xtjt = xtjt￿1 + Kopt￿t
and we close the iterations. We only need to apply the equations from t = 1 until T and we
can compute the loglikelihood function. The whole process takes only a fraction of a second
on a modern laptop computer.
194.2.2. The Particle Filter
Unfortunately, linearity and Gaussanity are quite restrictive assumptions. For example, lin-
earization eliminates asymmetries, threshold e⁄ects, precautionary behavior, big shocks, and
many other phenomena of interest in macroeconomics. Moreover, linearization induces an
approximation error. Even if we were able to evaluate the likelihood implied by that solu-
tion, we would not be evaluating the likelihood of the exact solution of the model but the
likelihood implied by the approximated linear solution of the model. Both objects may be
quite di⁄erent and some care is required when we proceed to perform inference (for further
details, see FernÆndez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ram￿rez, and Santos, 2006). The e⁄ects of this are
worse than you may think. First, there are theoretical arguments. Second order errors in the
approximated policy function may imply ￿rst order errors in the loglikelihood function. As
the sample size grows, the error in the loglikelihood function also grows and we may have
inconsistent point estimates. Second, linearization complicates the identi￿cation of parame-
ters (or makes it plainly impossible as, for example, the coe¢ cient of risk aversion in a model
with Epstein-Zin preferences as introduced by Epstein and Zin, 1989 and 1991). Finally,
computational evidence suggests that those e⁄ects may be important in many applications.
Similarly Gaussanity eliminates the possibility of talking about time-varying volatility
in time series, which is a fundamental issue in macroeconomics. For instance, McConnell
and PØrez-Quir￿s (2000), Kim and Nelson (1998), FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez
(2007), and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008) have accumulated rather compelling evidence
of the importance of time-varying volatility to account for the dynamics of U.S. data. Any
linear Gaussian model cannot talk about this evidence at all. Similarly, linear models cannot
deal with models that display regime switching, an important feature of much recent research
(see Sims and Zha, 2006, and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha, 2006a and b).
When the state space representation is not linear or when the shocks are not normal,
￿ltering becomes more complicated because the conditional distributions of states do not
belong, in general, to any known family. How do we keep track of them? We mentioned before
that analytic methods are unfeasible except in a few cases. Therefore, we need to resort to
some type of simulation. An algorithm that has been used recently with much success is the
particle ￿lter, a particular example of a Sequential Monte Carlo (see the technical appendix
to FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez (2007) for alternative approaches).
Because of space constraints, I will not discuss the ￿lter in much detail (FernÆndez-
Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez, 2005 and 2007, provide all the technical background; see
20Arulampalam et al., 2002 for a general introduction, and Doucet, de Freitas, and Gordon,
2001, for a collection of applications). The main idea, however, is extremely simple: we
replace the conditional distribution fp(Stjyt￿1;￿)g
T








from the sequence fp(Stjyt￿1;￿)g
T
t=1 generated by simulation. Then, by a





























The problem is then to draw from fp(Stjyt￿1;￿)g
T
t=1. But, following Rubin (1988), we



































i=1 is a draw from p(Stjyt;￿).












from p(Stjyt;￿). But this is nothing more than the update of our estimate of St to add the
information on yt that Bayes￿theorem is asking for.
The reader may be surprised by the need to resample to obtain a new conditional distrib-
ution. However, without resampling, all of the sequences would become arbitrarily far away
from the true sequence of states and the sequence that is closer to the true states dominates
all of the remaining ones in weight. Hence, the simulation degenerates after a few steps and







, we draw N vectors of exogenous shocks to the model (for example,
the productivity or the preference shocks) from their corresponding distributions and apply






. This step, known as forecast, puts us
back at the beginning of Proposition 1, but with the di⁄erence that we have moved forward
one period in our conditioning, from tjt￿1 to t+1jt; implementing in that way the Chapman-
Kolmogorov equation.
21The following pseudo-code summarizes the description of the algorithm:



















, the law of
motion for states and the distribution of shocks "t.























. If t < T set t   t + 1 and go to
step 1. Otherwise stop.






























and get an estimate of the likelihood of the model given ￿. Del Moral and Jacod (2002) and
K￿nsch (2005) show weak conditions for the consistency of this estimator and for a central
limit theorem to apply.
4.3. Exploring the Likelihood Function
Once we have an evaluation of the likelihood function from ￿ltering theory, we need to
explore it, either by maximization or by description. As I explained before when I motivated
the Bayesian choice, maximization is particularly challenging and the results are often not
very robust. Consequently, I will not get into a discussion of how we can attempt to solve








(where I have eliminated the index of the model to ease notation). With the result of the
previous subsection, we can evaluate ￿
￿
￿jyT￿
for a given ￿ (up to a proportionality constant),
but characterizing the whole posterior is nearly impossible, since we do not even have a close
form solution for p(yTj￿):
22This challenge, which for a long time was the main barrier to Bayesian inference, can
nowadays easily be addressed by the use of McMc methods. A full exposition of McMc meth-
ods would occupy an entire book (as in Robert and Casella, 2007). Luckily enough, the basic




. Then, we simulate from the chain and, as the Glivenko-Cantelli the-
orem does its magic, we approximate ￿
￿
￿jyT￿
by the empirical distribution generated by the
chain. This twist of McMc methods is pure genius. Usually, we have a theory that implies a
Markov chain. For example, our DSGE model implies a Markov process for output and we
want to characterize it (this is what chapters 11 to 14 of Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott, 1989,
do). In McMc, we proceed backward: we have ￿
￿
￿jyT￿
(or at least a procedure to evaluate
it) and we come up with a Markov chain that generates it.
This idea would not be very practical unless we had a constructive method to specify the
Markov chain. Fortunately, we have such a procedure, although, interestingly enough, only
one. This procedure is known as the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (the Gibbs sampler is
a particular case of Metropolis-Hastings). In the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, we come
up with a new proposed value of the parameter and we evaluate whether it increases the
posterior. If it does, we accept it with probability 1. If it does not, we accept it with some
probability less than 1. In such a way, we always go toward the higher regions of the posterior
but we also travel, with some probability, towards the lower regions. This procedure avoids
getting trapped in local maxima. A simple pseudo-code for a plain vanilla Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm is as follows:
Step 0, Initialization: Set i   0 and an initial ￿i. Solve the model for ￿i
and build the state space representation: Evaluate ￿ (￿i) and p(yTj￿i). Set i  
i + 1:
Step 1, Proposal draw: Get a draw ￿
￿
i from a proposal density q (￿i￿1;￿
￿
i).
Step 2, Solving the Model: Solve the model for ￿
￿
i and build the new state
space representation.









i ;￿i￿1) set ￿i = ￿
￿
i,
otherwise ￿i = ￿i￿1.
Step 5, Iteration: If i < M, set i   i + 1 and go to step 1. Otherwise stop.
23This algorithm requires us to specify a proposal density q (￿;￿). The standard practice
(and the easiest) is to choose a random walk proposal, ￿
￿
i = ￿i￿1 + ￿i, ￿i ￿ N (0;￿￿), where
￿￿ is a scaling matrix that the researcher selects to obtain the appropriate acceptance ratio of
proposals (Roberts, Gelman and Gilks, 1997, provide the user with guidelines for the optimal
acceptance ratios that maximize the rate of convergence of the empirical distribution toward
the ergodic distribution). Of course, we can always follow more sophisticated versions of
the algorithm, but for most researchers, the time and e⁄ort involved in re￿nements will not
compensate for the improvements in e¢ ciency.
If we are using the particle ￿lter, we need to keep the random numbers of the simulation
constant across iterations of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. As emphasized by McFadden
(1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989), ￿xing the random numbers across iterations is required
to achieve stochastic equicontinuity. Thanks to it, the pointwise convergence of the likeli-
hood (9) to the exact likelihood we stated above becomes uniform convergence. Although
not strictly necessary in a Bayesian context, uniform continuity minimizes the numerical
instabilities created by the ￿chatter￿of random numbers across iterations.
Once we have run the algorithm for a su¢ cient number of iterations (see Mengersen,
Robert, and Guihenneuc-Jouyaux, 1999, for a review of convergence tests), we can perform
inference: we have an empirical approximation of the posterior of the model and ￿nding
means, standard deviations, and other objects of interest is a trivial task. In the interest of
space, I omit a discussion of how to select a good initial value ￿0.16 The values we would
have for a standard calibration exercise are, in general, a good default choice.
The reader who is not familiar with the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm may feel that the
previous discussion introduced many concepts. Yes, but none of them is particularly deep
once one has thought about them a bit more carefully. Most important, once you get the
gist of it, McMc methods are surprisingly easy to code, much more, in fact, than even simple
optimization algorithms, and they can be easily be recycled for future estimations. This
is why I said in section 3 that nowadays doing Bayesian econometrics is easier than doing
classical inference.
16The initial states S0 for the ￿lter can also be though of as parameters of the model. However, it is usually
is easier to sample from the ergodic distribution of states implied by ￿0:
245. An Application
The previous pages would look dry and abstract without an application that illustrates how
we do things in practice. Hence, I am presenting a simple estimation exercise that I borrow
from a recent paper I coauthored with Juan Rubio-Ram￿rez (FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ram￿rez, 2008). Since in that paper we were trying to explore how stable over time were the
parameters of DSGE models when we let them vary over time, we took care in estimating
a model that could be easily accepted by as many readers as possible as embodying the
standard New Keynesian DSGE model. Even if my objectives now are di⁄erent, the same
justi￿cation for the model still holds: this will be as standard a model as I know how to write.
Despite any possible vehement claims to the contrary, my choice of application implies
an implicit endorsement of the New Keynesian model. If I thought that the model was
completely worthless, my behavior would be slightly schizophrenic. And yes, there are good
things in the model. It is built around the core of the neoclassical growth model, which is
the workhorse of modern macroeconomics and which o⁄ers a reasonable account of a set of
important stylized facts, both at the long run and business cycle frequencies. Keynes (1936)
complained in the General Theory that David Hume had a foot and a half in the classical
world. Modern DSGE models fully share this nature.17 In addition, the model introduces a
number of real and nominal rigidities that generate the higher degree of persistence we see in
the data and allow for a non-trivial role of monetary policy, which as we discussed in section
2, perhaps we also ￿nd in the data.
However, we need to remember the many shortcomings of the model. We may as well
begin with its core, the neoclassical growth model. Growth theorist have accumulated many
objections to the basic growth model: it does not have an endogenous mechanism for long-run
growth, the existence of a balanced growth path violates some observations in the data, the
model does not account for the large cross-country di⁄erences in income per capita, and so
forth. Our model will su⁄er from all of those objections.
The second line of criticism regards the nominal rigidities, which are added in an ad hoc
way through Calvo pricing. Beyond the lack of microfoundations, Calvo pricing misses many
17That is why many argue, with some plausibility, that New Keynesian models are not that Keynesian
after all (see Farmer, 2007). Given the importance they give to a neoclassical core, the key role of money,
and the preference they generate for low and stable in￿ ation, we could just as well call them neomonetarist
models. However, after seeing the recent uproar at the University of Chicago regarding the new Milton
Friedman Institute for Research in Economics, it is clear that the New Keynesian brand still sells better in
many quarters.
25aspects of the microeconomic evidence of pricing behavior by ￿rms documented over the last
few years (`lvarez et al. 2005, Bils and Klenow, 2004, Bils, Klenow and Malin, 2008, Dhyne
et al. 2006, Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008, and Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008, among many
others). Finally, the model does a terrible job of pricing ￿nancial assets, a point I will revisit
in section 6.
In the interest of space, I will present only the most basic description of the model without
the full background. The interested reader can get many more details at the online appendix
www.econ.upenn.edu/~jesusfv/benchmark_DSGE.pdf. The basic structure of the model in-
cludes a continuum of households that work, consume, and save, a continuum of intermediate
good producers that rent capital and labor to manufacture intermediate goods, a ￿nal good
producer that aggregates the intermediate goods, a labor ￿packer￿that aggregates di⁄erent
types of labor into a homogeneous input, and a government that implements monetary policy
by ￿xing the short-run nominal interest rate through open market operations. Both prices
and wages will be subject to rigidities that limit how often they can be changed.
5.1. The Households
The ￿rst type of agents in our model will be the households. We want to have a continuum
of them because, in that way, we can generate a whole distribution of wages in the economy,
with each household charging its own di⁄erentiated wage. At the same time, we do not want
to have too much heterogeneity, because this will make computing the model a daunting task.
The trick to combine di⁄erent wages but not a lot of heterogeneity is to assume a separable
utility function in consumption and labor and complete markets. Complete markets give us
the basic risk-sharing result that, in equilibrium, marginal utilities are equated. If utility is
separable in consumption, then perfect risk-sharing implies that all households consume the
same amount of the ￿nal good and hold the same level of capital, collapsing the distribution
of agents along that dimension. Finally, the requirement that we have a balanced growth


















where j is the index of the household, E0 is the conditional expectation operator, cjt is
consumption, mojt=pt are real money balances, pt is the aggregate price level, and ljt is hours
worked. In addition, we have the discount factor, ￿, a degree of habit persistence, h, which
26will help to induce inertia in the responses of consumption to shocks, and the Frisch labor
supply elasticity, 1=#:
The period utility function is shifted by two shocks. First, a shock to intertemporal
preferences, dt, that works as a demand shock, inducing agents to consume more or less
in the current period. Second, a shock to labor supply, to capture the movements in the
observed wedge in the ￿rst order condition relating consumption and labor (Hall, 1997). For
simplicity, we postulate that both shocks follow an autoregressive process of order 1 in logs:
logdt = ￿d logdt￿1 + ￿d"d;t where "d;t ￿ N(0;1);
log’t = ￿’ log’t￿1 + ￿’"’;t where "’;t ￿ N(0;1):
The standard deviation of the shocks, ￿d and ￿’, is constant over time, but we could easily
introduce a time component to it (FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez, 2007). Time-
varying volatility in the shocks helps to understand the changing volatility of U.S. and other
Western economies over the last decades that has been named the ￿Great Moderation￿by
Stock and Watson (2003).
Households trade on the whole set of Arrow-Debreu securities, contingent on idiosyncratic
and aggregate events. My notation ajt+1 indicates the amount of those securities that pay
one unit of consumption in event !j;t+1;t purchased by household j at time t at (real) price
qjt+1;t. To save on notation, we drop the explicit dependence on the event. Households also
hold an amount bjt of government bonds that pay a nominal gross interest rate of Rt and
invest xt. Then, the j ￿ th household￿ s budget constraint is:





















+ ajt + Tt + zt
where wjt is the real wage paid per unit of labor, rt the real rental price of capital, ujt > 0 the
utilization rate of capital, ￿
￿1
t ￿[ujt] is the physical cost of rate ujt in resource terms (where
￿[u] = ￿1 (u ￿ 1)+
￿2
2 (u￿1)2 and ￿1;￿2 ￿ 0), ￿t is an investment-speci￿c technological shock
that shifts the relative price of capital, Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the government, and
zt is the household share of the pro￿ts of the ￿rms in the economy. This budget constraint
is slightly di⁄erent from a conventional one because households are monopolistic suppliers of
their own type of work j. Therefore, the household ￿xes wjt (subject to some rigidities to be
27speci￿ed below) and supplies the amount of labor ljt demanded at that wage. We can think
of the household either as an independent businessman who can set its own rate or as a union
that negotiates a particular wage rate. This assumption is relatively inconsequential. At the
cost of some additional algebra, we could also let ￿rms set wages and households supply the
desired labor at such wages.
The law of motion for capital is given by:























where ￿ ￿ 0 and ￿x is the long-run growth of investment. The speci￿cation of the adjustment
cost function captures the idea that the costs are with respect to moving away from the path of
investment growth that we would have in the balanced growth path. In front of investment,
we have an investment-speci￿c technological shock ￿t that also follows an autoregressive
process:
￿t = ￿t￿1 exp(￿￿ + z￿;t) where z￿;t = ￿￿"￿;t and "￿;t ￿ N(0;1):
The investment-speci￿c technological shock accounts for the fall in the relative price of capital
observed in the U.S. economy since the Second World War and it plays a crucial role in
accounting for long-run growth and in generating business cycle ￿ uctuations (see the rather
compelling evidence in Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell, 1997 and 2000).The process for
investment-speci￿c technological change generates the ￿rst unit root in the model and it will
be one source of growth in the economy.
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5
where the household chooses cjt, bjt, ujt, kjt, xjt, wjt, ljt and ajt+1 (maximization with
28respect to money holdings comes from the budget constraint), ￿t is the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with the budget constraint, and Qt the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
law of motion of capital. Since I argued before that with complete markets and separable
utility, marginal utilities will be equated in all states of nature and all periods, I do not need
to index the multipliers by j.
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to cjt, bjt, ujt, kjt, and xjt are:
dt (cjt ￿ hcjt￿1)












































I do not include the ￿rst order conditions with respect to Arrow-Debreu securities, since we
do not need them to solve for the equilibrium of the economy. Nevertheless, those ￿rst order
conditions will be useful below to price the securities. In particular, from the second equation,




dt (cjt+1 ￿ hcjt)
￿1 ￿ h￿Et+1dt+2 (cjt+2 ￿ hcjt+1)
￿1
dt (cjt ￿ hcjt￿1)
￿1 ￿ h￿Etdt+1 (cjt+1 ￿ hcjt)
￿1
is the pricing kernel of the economy.
If we de￿ne the (marginal) Tobin￿ s Q as qt =
Qt
￿t (the value of installed capital in terms







































The ￿rst equation tells us that the relative price of capital is equal to the (expected) return
we will get from it in the next period
(1 ￿ ￿)qt+1 | {z }
Sale Value






Compensation for Utilization Rate
29times the pricing kernel. The second equation determines that if S [￿] = 0 (i.e., there are no




i.e., the marginal Tobin￿ s Q is equal to the replacement cost of capital (the relative price of
capital), which falls over time as ￿t increases. Furthermore, if ￿t = 1 (as we have in the basic
real business cycle model), the relative price of capital is trivially equated to 1.
The necessary conditions with respect to labor and wages are more involved. There is
a labor ￿packer￿that aggregates the di⁄erentiated labor supplied by each household into a
homogeneous labor unit that intermediate good producers hire in a competitive market. The













where 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 is the elasticity of substitution among di⁄erent types of labor and ld
t is the
aggregate labor demand.
The labor ￿packer￿maximizes pro￿ts subject to the production function (10), taking as
given all di⁄erentiated labor wages wjt and the wage wt for ld



















which shows that the elasticity of substitution also controls the elasticity of demand for j￿th











Now we can specify the wage-setting mechanism. There are several mechanisms for in-
troducing wage rigidities but one that is particularly clever and simple is a time-dependent
rule called Calvo pricing. In each period, a fraction 1￿￿w of households can reoptimize their
wages and set a nominal value ptwjt. All other households can only partially index their
30wages by past in￿ ation with an indexation parameter ￿w 2 [0;1]. Therefore, the real wage of








The probability 1 ￿ ￿w is the reduced-form representation of a more microfounded origin of
wage rigidities (quadratic adjustment costs as in the original Calvo paper, 1983, contract
costs, Caplin and Leahy, 1991 and 1997, or information limitations, Mankiw and Reis, 2002,
or Sims, 2002), which we do not include in the model to keep the number of equations within
reasonable bounds. In section 6, I will discuss the problems of Calvo pricing in detail. Su¢ ce
it to say here that, despite many potential problems, Calvo pricing is so simple that it still
constitutes the natural benchmark for price and wage rigidities. This is due to the memoryless
structure of the mechanism: we do not need to keep track of when wages reoptimized the last
time, since ￿w is time independent.
Relying on the separability of the utility function and the presence of complete markets,








































Note how we have modi￿ed the discount factor to include the probability ￿w that the house-
hold has to keep the wage for one more period. Once the household can reoptimize, the
continuation of the decision problem is independent from our choice of wage today, and










goes to zero for the previous sum to be well de￿ned.
Also, because of complete markets, all of the households reoptimazing wages in the current
period will pick the same wage and we can drop the jth from wjt. The ￿rst order condition



















































t is the new optimal wage. This expression involves in￿nite sums that are di¢ cult
to handle computationally. It is much simpler to write the ￿rst order conditions as f1
t = f2
t
























































Now, if we put the previous equations together and drop the j￿ s indexes (that are redun-
dant), we have the ￿rst order conditions
dt (ct ￿ hct￿1)








































































+ ajt + Tt + zt






























































t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿w)w
￿1￿￿
t :
5.2. The Final Good Producer














where " is the elasticity of substitution. Similarly to the labor ￿packer,￿ the ￿nal good
producer is perfectly competitive and maximizes pro￿ts subject to the production function
(13), taking as given all intermediate goods prices pti and the ￿nal good price pt. Thus, the




















5.3. Intermediate Good Producers
As mentioned above, there is a continuum of intermediate goods producers, each of which has





￿1￿￿ ￿ ￿zt where kit￿1 is the capital rented
by the ￿rm, ld
it is the amount of the labor input rented from the labor ￿packer,￿and where
33At, a neutral technology level, evolves as:
At = At￿1 exp(￿A + zA;t) where zA;t = ￿A"A;t and "A;t ￿ N(0;1)
This process incorporates a second unit root in the model. The ￿xed cost of production ￿ is






t to make it grow with the economy (think, for example,
of the ￿xed cost of paying some fees for keeping the factory open: it is natural to think that
the fees will increase with income). Otherwise, the ￿xed cost would become asymptotically
irrelevant. In a balanced growth path, zt is precisely the growth factor in the economy that
we want to scale for. The role of the ￿xed cost is to roughly eliminate pro￿ts in equilibrium
and to allow us to dispense with the entry and exit of intermediate good producers.






t , we can combine the processes for At and ￿t to get:







Many of the variables in the economy, like ct, will be cointegrated in equilibrium with zt. This
cointegration captures the evidence of constant main ratios of the economy in a stochastic
trend environment with the advantage that, with respect to the empirical literature, the
cointegration vector is microfounded and implied by the optimization decision of the agents
in the model and not exogenously postulated by the econometrician (for the origin of this
idea, see King et al., 1991).
The problem of intermediate goods producers can be chopped into two parts. First, given
input prices wt and rt, they rent ld






















The solution of this problem implies that all intermediate good ￿rms equate their capital-






















A useful observation is that neither of these expressions depends on i since At and input
prices are common for all ￿rms.
The second part of the problem is to set a price for the intermediate good. In a similar
vein to the household, the intermediate good producer is subject to Calvo pricing, where now
the probability of reoptimizing prices is 1 ￿ ￿p and the indexation parameter is ￿ 2 [0;1].



































where future pro￿ts are valued using the pricing kernel ￿t+￿=￿t.










































This expression tells us that the price is equal to a weighted sum of future expected mark-ups.
We can express this condition recursively as:
"g
1






















































+ (1 ￿ ￿p)￿
￿1￿"
t
5.4. The Government Problem
The last agent in the model is the government. To simplify things I forget about ￿scal policy



























that sets the short-term nominal interest rates as a function of past interest rates, in￿ ation





average growth of the economy, ￿z. Introducing this growth gap avoids the need to specify a
measure of the output gap (always somehow arbitrary) and, more important, ￿ts the evidence
better (Orphanides, 2002). The term mt is a random shock to monetary policy such that
mt = ￿m"mt, where "mt ￿ N(0;1).
The other elements in the Taylor rule are the target level of in￿ ation, ￿, and the steady
state nominal gross return of capital; R. Since we are dealing with a general equilibrium
model, the government can pick either ￿ or R but not both (R is equal to ￿ times the steady
state real interest rate).
The nominal interest rate can be implemented either through open market operations (as
has been the norm for the last several decades) or through paying interest on bank reserves
(as the Fed has recently begun to do in the United States). In both cases, monetary policy
generates either a surplus (or a de￿cit) that is eliminated through lump-sum transfers Tt to
households.
5.5. Aggregation, Equilibrium, and Solution
Now, we can add all of the previous expressions to ￿nd aggregate variables and de￿ne an
equilibrium. First, we have aggregate demand, yd
t = ct + xt + ￿
￿1
t ￿[ut]kt￿1. Second, by









































































A de￿nition of equilibrium in this economy is standard and it is characterized by ￿rst order
conditions of the household, the ￿rst order conditions of the ￿rms, the recursive de￿nitions
of g1
t and g2
t, the Taylor rule of the government, and market clearing.
Since the model has two unit roots, one in the investment-speci￿c technological change and
one in the neutral technological change, we need to rescale all the variables to avoid solving
the model with non-stationary variables (a solution that is feasible, but most cumbersome).
The scaling will be given by the variable zt in such a way that, for any arbitrary variable
xt, we will have e xt = xt=zt: Partial exceptions are the variables, e rt = rt￿t, e qt = qt￿t, and
e kt = kt
zt￿t: Once the model has been rescaled, we can ￿nd the steady state and solve the model
by loglinearizating around the steady state.
Loglinearization is both a fast and e¢ cient method for solving large-scale DSGE models.
I have documented elsewhere (Aruoba, FernÆndez-Villaverde, and Rubio-Ram￿rez, 2006),
that it is a nice compromise between speed and accuracy in many applications of interest.
Furthermore, it can easily be extended to include higher order terms (Judd, 1998). Once I
have solved the model, I use the Kalman ￿lter to evaluate the likelihood of the model, given
some parameter values. The whole process takes less than 1 second per evaluation of the
likelihood.
375.6. Empirical Results
I estimate the DSGE model using ￿ve time series for the U.S. economy: 1) the relative price of
investment with respect to the price of consumption, 2) real output per capita growth, 3) real
wages per capita, 4) the consumer price index, and 5) the federal funds rate (the interest rate
at which banks lend balances at the Federal Reserve System to each other, usually overnight).
This series captures the main aspects of the dynamics of the data and model much of the
information that a policy maker is interested in. The sample is 1959.Q1 - 2007.Q1.
To ￿nd the real output per capita series, I ￿rst de￿ne nominal output as nominal consump-
tion plus nominal gross investment. Nominal consumption is the sum of personal consumption
expenditures on nondurable goods and services while nominal gross investment is the sum
of personal consumption expenditures on durable goods, private residential investment, and
nonresidential ￿xed investment. Per capita nominal output is equal to the ratio between
our nominal output series and the civilian noninstitutional population between 16 and 65. I
transform nominal quantities into real ones using the investment de￿ ator computed by Fisher
(2006), a series that unfortunately ends early in 2000:Q4. Following Fisher￿ s methodology,
I have extended the series to 2007:Q1. Real wages are de￿ned as compensation per hour in
the nonfarm business sector divided by the CPI de￿ ator.
My next step is to specify priors. To facilitate the task of the reader who wants to continue
exploring the estimation of DSGE models, I would follow the choices of Smets and Wouters
(2007) with a few trivial changes. Instead of a long (and, most likely, boring) discussion of
each prior, I just point out that I am selecting mainstream priors that are centered around
the median value of estimates of micro and macro data. Also, I ￿x some parameters that are







h   ￿p ￿ ￿w
Ga(0:25;0:1) Be(0:7;0:1) N (9;3) Be(0:5;0:1) Be(0:5;0:15) Be(0:5;0:1)
￿w ￿R ￿y ￿￿ 100(￿ ￿ 1) #
Be(0:5;0:1) Be(0:75;0:1) N (0:12;0:05) N (1:5;0:125) Ga(0:95;0:1) N(1;0:25)
￿ ￿ ￿d ￿’ exp(￿A) exp(￿d)
N (4;1:5) N (0:3;0:025) Be(0:5;0:2) Be(0:5;0:2) IG(0:1;2) IG(0:1;2)
exp(￿’) exp(￿￿) exp(￿e) 100￿￿ 100￿A
IG(0:1;2) IG(0:1;2) IG(0:1;2) N (0:34;0:1) N (0:178;0:075)
38while the ￿xed parameters are:
Table 2: Fixed Parameters
￿ " ￿ ￿ ￿2
0:025 10 10 0 0:001
Perhaps the only two ￿xed parameters that are interesting to discuss are " and ￿, both
with a value of 10. These values imply an average mark-up of around 10 percent, in line with
many estimates.
I generate 75,000 draws from the posterior using a random walk Metropolis-Hastings.
While 75,000 draws is a comparatively low number, there was a substantial and long search
for good initial parameter values, which means that the estimates were stable and passed all
the usual tests of convergence. The posterior medians and the 5 and 95 percentile values
of the 23 estimated parameters of the model are reported in table 3. Figure 1 plots the
histograms of each parameter (one can think of the likelihood as the combination of all those
histograms in a highly dimensional object).18
Table 3: Median Estimated Parameters (5 and 95 per. in parentheses)



















































What do we learn from our estimates? First, the discount factor ￿ is very high, 0.998.
This is quite usual in DSGE models, since the likelihood wants to match a low interest rate.
18These results are also reported in FernÆndez-Villaverde, Guerr￿n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ram￿rez (2008).
39Since we have long-run growth in the model, the log utility function generates a relatively
high interest rate without the help of any discounting. Second, we have a very high degree of
habit, around 0.97. This is necessary to match the slow response of the economy to shocks as
documented by innumerable number of VAR exercises. Third, the Frisch elasticity of labor
supply is 0.85 (1/1.17). This is a nice surprise, since it is a relatively low number, which
makes it quite close to the estimates of the micro literature (in fact, some micro estimates
are higher than 0.85!). Since one of the criticisms of DSGE models has traditionally been
that they assumed a large Frisch elasticity, our model does not su⁄er from this problem.19
Investment is subject to high adjustment costs, 9.51. Again, this is because we want to
match a slow response of investment to shocks. The elasticity of output to capital, 0:21, is
very low but similar to the results by Smets and Wouters (2007). When we interpret this
number, we need to remember that, on top of the payments to capital, we have the pro￿ts
of the intermediate good producers. Since the national income and product accounts lump
together both quantities as gross operating surplus, the result is consistent with the evidence
on income distribution.
The estimates also reveal a fair amount of nominal rigidities. The Calvo parameter for
price adjustment, ￿p; is 0.82 (an average ￿ve-quarter pricing cycle) and for wages it is 0.68
(an average three-quarter wage cycle). The indexation level for prices, ￿; is 0.63, and the
indexation for wages is nearly the same, 0:62: Despite the fair amount of uncertainty in the
posterior (for example, ￿ ranges between 0:46 and 0:79), the model points out the important
role of nominal rigidities. There is, of course, the counterargument that since the only way
the model can account for the e⁄ects of monetary shocks is through picking up large nominal
rigidities, the likelihood takes us to zones with high rigidity. In a model with other channels
for monetary policy to play a role (for example, with imperfect common knowledge), the
likelihood may prefer less nominal rigidities. In that sense, if the DSGE model is extremely
misspeci￿ed, our inference may lead us to wrong conclusions.
The estimates for the coe¢ cients of the Taylor rule are in line with the estimates of single
equation models (Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler, 2000). The coe¢ cient on in￿ ation, ￿￿ = 1:29,
shows that the Fed respects the Taylor principle (without entering here into a discussion of
whether it did in di⁄erent subperiods as defended by Lubick and Schorfheide, 2004). The
coe¢ cient on output, ￿y = 0:19, signals a weak but positive response to the output growth
19On the other hand, the model, like all New Keynesian models, requires quite large preference shocks. It
is not clear to me that we have made much progress by substituting a high Frisch elasticity for these large
shocks.
40gap. The coe¢ cient on lagged interest rates, ￿R = 0:77, indicates a strong desire to smooth
the changes on nominal interest rates over time, which has been attributed either to an
avoidance of disruptions in the money market or to allow new information about the state of
the economy to emerge more fully before a large change in monetary policy is fully passed on.
The estimated target in￿ ation is a quarterly 1 percent, perhaps high by today￿ s standards
but in line with the behavior of prices during the whole sample.
The growth rates of the investment-speci￿c technological change, ￿￿, and of the neutral
technology, ￿A, are roughly equal. This means that the estimated average growth rate of the
U.S. economy in per capita terms, (￿A + ￿￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿) is 0.43 percent per quarter, or 1.7
percent annually. Finally, the estimated standard deviations of shocks show an important
role for both technological shocks and for preference shocks.
6. Areas of Future Research
In the next few pages, I will outline some of the potential areas of future research for the
formulation and estimation of DSGE models. I do not attempt to map out all existing
problems. Beyond being rather foolish, it would take me dozens of pages just to brie￿ y
describe some of the open questions I am aware of. I will just talk about three questions I
have been thinking about lately: better pricing mechanisms, asset pricing, and more robust
inference.
6.1. Better Pricing Mechanisms
In our application, we assumed a simple Calvo pricing mechanism. Unfortunately, the jury
is still out regarding how bad a simpli￿cation it is to assume that the probability of changing
prices (or wages) is ￿xed and exogenous. Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999), in an important
paper, argue that state-dependent pricing (￿rms decide when to change prices given some
costs and their states) is not only a more natural setup for thinking about rigidities but also
an environment that may provide very di⁄erent answers than the basic Calvo pricing.
More recently, Bils, Klenow, and Malin (2008) have presented compelling evidence that
state-dependent pricing is also a better description of the data. Bils, Klenow and Malin￿ s
paper is a remarkably nice contribution because the mapping between microevidence of price
and wages changes and nominal rigidity in the aggregate is particularly subtle. An interesting
characteristic of our Calvo pricing mechanism is that all the wages are being changed in
41every period, some because of reoptimization, some because of indexing. Therefore, strictly
speaking, the average duration of wages in this model is one period. In the normal setup, we
equate a period with one quarter, which indicates that any lower degree of price changes in
the data implies that the model display ￿excess￿price volatility. A researcher must then set
up a smart ￿mousetrap.￿Bils, Klenow, and Malin ￿nd their trap in the reset price in￿ ation
that they build from micro CPI data. This reset in￿ ation clearly indicates that Calvo pricing
cannot capture many of the features of the micro data and the estimated persistence of
shocks. The bad news is, of course, that handling a state-dependent pricing model is rather
challenging (we have to track a non-trivial distribution of prices), which limits our ability
to estimate it. Being able to write, solve, and estimate DSGE models with better pricing
mechanisms is, therefore, a ￿rst order of business.
6.2. Asset Pricing
So far, assets and asset pricing have only made a collateral appearance in our exposition.
This is a defect common to much of macroeconomics, where quantities (consumption, in-
vestment, hours worked) play a much bigger role than prices. However, if we take seriously
the implications of DSGE models for quantities, it is inconsistent not to do the same for
prices, in particular asset prices. You cannot believe the result while denying the mechanism:
it is through asset prices that the market signals the need to increase or decrease current
consumption and, in conjunction with wages, the level of hours worked. Furthermore, one of
the key questions of modern macroeconomics, the welfare cost of aggregate ￿ uctuation, is, in
a precise sense, an exercise in asset pricing. Roughly speaking, a high market price for risk
will denote a high welfare cost of aggregate ￿ uctuations and low market price for risk, a low
welfare cost.
The plight with asset prices is, of course, that DSGE models do a terrible job at matching
them: we cannot account for the risk-free interest rate (Weil, 1989), the equity premium
(Mehra and Prescott, 1985), the excess volatility puzzle, the value premium, the slope of the
yield curve, or any other of a long and ever-growing list of related observations (Campbell,
2003).
The origin of our concerns is that the stochastic discount factor (SDF) implied by the
model does not covariate with observed returns in the correct way (Hansen and Jagannathan,
1991). For ease of exposition, let me set h = 0 (the role of habits will become clearer in a
moment) and use the equilibrium condition that individual consumption is equal to aggregate














and the variance of zz;t+1 is low, we have that Etmt ￿ ￿e￿￿z and ￿t (mt) is small.
To get a sense of the importance of the ￿rst result, we can plug in some reasonable value
for the parameters. The annual long-run per capita growth of the U.S. economy between
1865-2007 has been around 1.9 percent. I then set ￿z = 0:019: For the discount factor, I pick
￿ = 0:999, which is even higher than our point estimate in section 5 but which makes my





However, in the data, we ￿nd that the risk-free real interest rate has been around 1 percent
(Campbell, 2003). This is, in a nutshell, the risk-free interest rate: even in a context where
agents practically do not discount the future and where the elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution (EIS) is 1, we create a high interest rate. By lowering ￿ or the EIS to more reasonable
numbers, we only make the puzzle stronger. The extension of the previous formula for the






where   is the EIS. Even by lowering the EIS to 0.5, we would have that e
1
 ￿z would be
around 1.04, which closes the door to any hope of ever matching the risk-free interest rate.
The second result, mt ￿ uctuates very little, implies that the market price for risk,
￿t (mt)
Etmt
is also low. But this observation just runs in the completely opposite direction of the equity
premium puzzle, where, given historical stock returns, we require a large market price for
risk.
43How can we ￿x the behavior of the SDF in a DSGE model? My previous argument re-
lied on three basic components. First, that consumption ￿ uctuates little. Second, that the
marginal utility of consumption ￿ uctuates little when consumption changes a small amount,
and third, that the pricing of assets is done with the SDF. The ￿rst component seems robust.
Notwithstanding recent skepticism (Barro, 2006), I ￿nd little evidence of the large ￿ uctua-
tions in consumption that we would need to make the model work. Even during the Great
Depression, the yearly ￿ uctuations were smaller than the total drop in consumption over the
whole episode (the number that Barro uses) and they were accompanied by an increase in
leisure. Exploring the third component, perhaps with incomplete markets or with bounded
rationality, is to venture into a wild territory beyond my current fancy for emotions. My
summary dismissals of the ￿rst and last argument force me to conclude that marginal utility
must, somehow, substantially ￿ uctuate when consumption moves just a little bit.
The standard constant relative risk aversion utility functions just cannot deliver these
large ￿ uctuations in marginal utility in general equilibrium. As we raise risk aversion, con-
sumers respond by making their consumption decisions smoother. Indeed, for su¢ ciently
large levels of risk aversion, consumption is so smooth that the market price for risk actually
falls (Rouwenhorst, 1995).
Something we can do is to introduce habits, as I did in the model that I estimated before.
Then, the SDF becomes
mt = ￿
dt (ct+1 ￿ hct)
￿1 ￿ h￿Et+1dt+2 (ct+2 ￿ hct+1)
￿1
dt (ct ￿ hct￿1)
￿1 ￿ h￿Etdt+1 (ct+1 ￿ hct)
￿1
and for a su¢ ciently high level of h, we can obtain large ￿ uctuations of the SDF. The intuition
is that, as h ! 1, we care about the ratio of the ￿rst di⁄erences in consumption and not the
ratio of levels, and this ratio of ￿rst di⁄erences can be quite large. Habits are plausible (after
a few trips in business class, coming back to coach is always a tremendous shock) and there
may be some good biological reasons why nature has given us a utility function with habits
(Becker and Rayo, 2007). At the same time, we do not know much about the right way to
introduce habits in the utility function (the simple form postulated above is rather arbitrary
and rejected by the data, as shown by Chen and Ludvigson, 2008) and habits generate interest
rates that are too volatile.
Consequently, a second avenue is the exploration of ￿exotic preferences.￿Standard ex-
pected utility functions, like the one used in this paper, face many theoretical limitations.
44Without being exhaustive, standard expected utility functions do not capture a preference
for the timing of resolution of uncertainty, they do not re￿ ect attitudes toward ambiguity,
and they cannot accommodate loss aversion. Moreover, the standard model assumes that
economic agents do not fear missespeci￿cation: they are sure that the model in their heads is
the same as the true description of the world. These limitations are potentially of empirical
importance as they may be behind our inability to account for many patterns in the data,
in particular the puzzling behavior of the prices of many assets and the risk premia (Bansal
and Yaron, 2004). Over the last several years, economists have paid increasing attention
to new forms of the utility function or with fear of misspeci￿cation. As a result of this in-
terest, there is a growing excitement about the potentialities of this research area (see the
survey by Backus, Routledge, and Zin, 2005, and the monograph by Hansen and Sargent,
2007, for models where the agents want to behave in a way that is robust to misspeci￿cation
mistakes). However, disappointingly little work has been done in the empirical estimation
of DSGE models (or even partial equilibrium models) with this type of preferences (see the
review of Hansen et al., 2007). A better and more realistic understanding of utility functions
is bound to deliver high yields and this understanding must rely on good econometrics (for
some recent attempts, see some of my own work on estimation of models with Esptein-Zin
preferences: Binsbergen et al., 2008).
6.3. More Robust Inference
The relative disadvantage of Bayesian methods when dealing with semiparametrics that we
discussed in section 3 is unsatisfactory. DSGE models are complex structures. To make the
models useful, researchers add many mechanisms that a⁄ect the dynamics of the economy:
sticky prices, sticky wages, adjustment costs, etc. In addition, DSGE models require many
parametric assumptions: the utility function, the production function, the adjustment costs,
the distribution of shocks, etc.
Some of those parametric choices are based on restrictions that the data impose on the
theory. For example, the observation that labor income share has been relative constant since
the 1950s suggests that a Cobb-Douglas production function may not be a bad approximation
to reality (although this assumption itself is problematic: see the evidence in Young, 2005,
among others). Similarly, the observation that the average labor supplied by adults in the
U.S. economy has been relatively constant over the last several decades requires a utility
function with a marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption that is linear
45in consumption.
Unfortunately, many other parametric assumptions do not have much of an empirical
foundation. Instead, researchers choose parametric forms for those functions based only
on convenience. For example, in the prototypical DSGE model that we presented in the
previous section, the investment adjustment cost function S (￿) plays an important role in
the dynamics of the economy. However, we do not know much about this function. Even the
mild restrictions that we imposed are not necessarily true in the data.20 For example, there
is much evidence of non-convex adjustment costs at the plant level (Cooper and Haltiwanger,
2006) and of nonlinear aggregate dynamics (Caballero and Engel, 1999). Similarly, we assume
a Gaussian structure for the shocks driving the dynamics of the economy. However, there
is much evidence (Geweke, 1993 and 1994, FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rub￿o-Ram￿rez, 2007)
that shocks to the economy are better described by distributions with fat tails.
The situation is worrisome. Functional form misspeci￿cation may contaminate the whole
inference exercise. Moreover, Heckman and Singer (1984) show that the estimates of dynamic
models are inconsistent if auxiliary assumptions (in their case, the modelling of individual
heterogeneity in duration models) are misspeci￿ed. These concerns raise the question of how
we can conduct inference that is more robust to auxiliary assumptions, especially within a
Bayesian framework.
Researchers need to develop new techniques that allow for the estimation of DSGE models
using a Bayesian framework where we can mix tight parametric assumptions along some
dimensions while keeping as much ￿ exibility as possible in those aspects of the model that
we have less con￿dence with. The potential bene￿ts from these new methods are huge. Our
approach shares many lines of contact with Chen and Ludvigson (2008), a paper that has
pioneered the use of more general classes of functions when estimating dynamic equilibrium
models within the context of methods of moments. Also, I am intrigued by the possibilities of
ideas like those in `lvarez and Jermann (2004), who use data from asset pricing to estimate
the welfare cost of the business cycle without the need to specify particular preferences. In
a more theoretical perspective, Kimball (2002) has worked out many implications of DSGE
models that do not depend on parametric assumptions. Some of these implications are
potentially usable for estimation.
20If we are linearizing the model or computing a second order approximation, we do not need to specify more
of the function than those properties. However, if we want to compute arbitrarily high order approximations
or use a projection solution method, we will need to specify a full parametric form.
467. Concluding Remarks
I claimed in the introduction that the New Macroeconometrics is a new and exciting area of
research. The previous pages, even if brief, have attempted to show the reader why the ￿eld is
important and how it de￿nes the new gold standard of empirical research in macroeconomics.
But there is an even better part of the deal. Much needs to be done in the ￿eld: the number
of papers I can think about writing in the next decade, both theoretical and applied, is nearly
unbounded (and, of course, I can only think about a very small subset of all the possible and
interesting papers to write). Since my ability and the ability of other practitioners in the New
Macroeconometrics are limited by the tight constraints of time, we need more eager young
minds to join us. I hope that some readers will ￿nd this call intriguing.
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Figure 1: Posterior Distribution, Smets-Wouters Priors
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